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RECENT DECISIONS
Insanity-Irresistible Impulse.-The defendant, James Simecek
was indicted and convicted of first degree murder of Verna Petan and
her three children. He had shot, stabbed and beaten them and then set
fire to the farmhouse. Evidence that his motive was to have intimate
relations with Mrs. Petan was weak and was disregarded by the trial
and appellate courts.
A plea of insanity was entered, based on an irresistible impulse,
the result of an epileptic condition. Evidence showed that there were
several cases of mental weakness and epilepsy on both sides of the de-
fendant's family. An alienist, Dr. Kamman, a specialist in nervous and
mental diseases, gave as his opinion that "at the time he (defendant)
killed these people he was having ... an epileptic seizure resulting in
a sudden discharge of nervous energy which comes on abruptly. In
such a seizure the uncontrollable desire to kill which is unmotivated
so far as any conscious motivation is concerned is almost an automatic
act during part of which he is not aware of what he is doing." The
facts and circumstances related "evince an unbalanced, abnormal, or
diseased mind." It was Dr. Kamman's opinion that the defendant was
not responsible for his acts at the time he committed the homicide.
The Supreme Court, on appeal, ruled that the trial judge was justified
in finding that the defendant was sane when he committed his homi-
cidal acts, saying: "This would be true even if all the expert witnesses
produced in rebuttal agreed with Dr. Kamman ... It is to be borne
in mind -that under the settled law of this state, insanity from a medi-
cal viewpoint does not necessarily constitute legal insanity in that it
constitutes a defense in prosecution for crime. One may be medically
insane and yet be responsible for his acts." Simecek v. State, 10 N.W.
(2d) 161 (Wis. 1943).
The court adopted the rule as laid down in Oborn v. State": "The
term 'insanity' in the law means such an abnormal condition of the
mind, from any cause as to render the afflicted one incapable of dis-
tinguishing between right and wrong in the given instance and so
rendering him unconscious of the punishable nature of his act."
In Butler v. State,2 the court was requested on the part of the
accused, to instruct the jury that even though the accused at the time
of the homicide knew the wrong of his act, yet he was legally insane,
if by impaired will power, resulting from an abnormal condition of the
mind, he was unable to resist the impulse to do the deed. That was
refused. However, the court stated: "There are things in some of the
cases liable to lead to the belief that legal insanity may exist if, though
the person be fully conscious of the wrong and its punishable charac-
I Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737, 738 (1910).
2 Butler v. State, 102 Wis. 264, 266, 78 N.W. 590 (1899); Accord: Jessner v.
State, 202 Wis. 184, 196, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
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ter, he, because of a perverted mind, is moved by an uncontrollable
impulse."
Thus the Wisconsin Court has ruled out the plea of an irrestible
impulse as relieving an individual from responsibility for his acts, but
has recognized the fact that some mental disease may cause a person
to act wrongfully, regardless of the fact that he can distinguish right
from wrong concerning the act committed.
Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court,3 have
adopted the irresistible impulse theory in addition to the right and
wrong tests. These jurisdictions limit freedom from responsibility to
acts where, though "capable of distinguishing between right and wrong,
the defendant was impelled to do the act by an irresistible impulse,
which means, before it will justify a verdict of acquittal, that his rea-
soning powers were so far dethroned b3 his diseased mental condition
as to deprive him of the will power to resist the insane impulse to
perpetrate the deed, knowing it to be wrong."
Courts recognizing the irresistible impulse theory hold that there can
be no legal responsibility without capacity of intellectual discrimination
plus freedom of the will.4 Thus, the legal basis of irresistible impulse
is that "freedom of the will" is essential to criminal responsibility. The
question is one for the psychiatric expert of many years experience.
It involves a thorough mental examination and a study of the defend-
ant's career. For, only by getting his past reactions to situations similar
to those presented by the crime and its setting can it be said with any
probability that the criminal act being considered could have been
resisted or not. It would seem that an impulse, shown to have been
irresistible should be just as destructive of the intention and volition
necessary to constitute the mental element of a criminal act, as uncon-
sciousness of the act, or mistake of fact.3
Courts which have been reluctant to accept the irresistible theory
seem to base the exclusion on a belief that no such disorder can exist,
or, that if it does exist, that it is too difficult to prove to be allowed as a
defense to crime, and, if accepted, would be dangerous to society. On
the other hand medical authorities have condemned the right and
wrong test as the sole test of insanity, asserting that there are persons
who, while capable of appreciating the difference between right and
wrong, are, as a matter of fact, under the influence of mental disease
and that its effects on the mind and conduct of the patient are.facts
S Smith v. U.S., 59 app. D.C. 144, 36F (2d) 548, 70 A.L.R. 654 (1929); Accord:
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193 (1887); Cline v.
Comm., 248 Ky. 609, 59 S.W. (2d) 19 (1933) ; State v. Moore, 42 N.M. 135,
76P (2d) 19 (1938) ; Eatman v. State, 169 Miss. 295, 153 So. 381 (1934).
4 State v. Green, 6P (2d) 177, 78 Utah 580 (1931).
5 Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, Henry Wiehofen, 44, 46 (1933).
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to be proved, just as much as were the existence and effect of certain
other diseases before they became the subjects of common knowledge.,
The questions 7 to be determined in states which have adopted the
irresistible impulse test in addition to the right and wrong test are
these:
1.) Was the defendant at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, as a matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of
the mind so as to be either idiotic or otherwise insane?
2.) If such be the case, did he know right from wrong as
applied to the particular act in question? If he did not have such
knowledge, he is not legally responsible.
3.) If he -did have such knowledge, he may nevertheless not
be legally responsible if the two following conditions concur:
a.) If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease,
he had so far lost the power to choose between the right
and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that
his agency was at the time destroyed.
b.) And if, at the same time, the alleged crime was
so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of
cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.
Condition (b) is not essential in some of the states which have adopted
the irresistible impulse test.
ALBERT J. HAUER.
6 Ann. Cas. 1912A36.
7 Parsons v. State, supra.
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